STATISTICS ON MODERN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL CARTELS, 1990-2005

This report explains the principal economic and legal features of a unique set of data on 283 modern private international cartels discovered anywhere in the world from January 1990 to the end of 2005. Measured in real 2005 money, aggregate cartel sales and overcharges totaled about $1.2 trillion and$500 billion, respectively. In the early 2000s, about 35 such cartels were discovered each year. We find that global cartels comprise more than half of the sample’s affected sales and are larger, longer lasting, and more injurious than other types. In the early 2000s world-wide corporate penalties stabilized at or above $2 billion per year, one-thousand times penalties in the early 1990s. More than 40% of those penalties were from settlements in private suits, and most of the rest are fines imposed by U.S. and EU antitrust authorities. Median penalties are low: from 1.4% to 4.9% of affected sales, depending on the type of prosecution. As a proportion of damages, median fines ranged from less than 1% for EU-wide cartels to 17.6% for Canada. Private plaintiffs obtained 38% of damages from international cartelists. World wide, median real cartel penalties of all types amounted to less than 5% of overcharges. [See Summary next page for more details]cartel, price fixing, overcharge, antitrust enforcement, optimal deterrence

HAL/S-360 compiler system specification

A three phase language compiler is described which produces IBM 360/370 compatible object modules and a set of simulation tables to aid in run time verification. A link edit step augments the standard OS linkage editor. A comprehensive run time system and library provide the HAL/S operating environment, error handling, a pseudo real time executive, and an extensive set of mathematical, conversion, I/O, and diagnostic routines. The specifications of the information flow and content for this system are also considered

HAL/S-360 compiler test activity report

The levels of testing employed in verifying the HAL/S-360 compiler were as follows: (1) typical applications program case testing; (2) functional testing of the compiler system and its generated code; and (3) machine oriented testing of compiler implementation on operational computers. Details of the initial test plan and subsequent adaptation are reported, along with complete test results for each phase which examined the production of object codes for every possible source statement

Attention and Saliency on the Internet: Evidence from an online recommendation system

Using high-frequency transaction-level data from an online retail store, we examine whether consumer choices on the internet are consistent with models of limited attention. We test whether consumers are more likely to buy products that receive a saliency shock when they are recommended by new products. To identify the saliency effect, we rely on i) the timing of new product arrivals, ii) the fact that new products are per se highly salient upon arrival, drawing more attention and iii) regional variation in the composition of recommendation sets. We find a sharp and robust 6% increase in the aggregate sales of existing products after they are recommended by a new product. To structurally disentangle the effect of saliency on a consumer's consideration and choice decision, we use data on individual transactions to estimate a probabilistic choice set model. We find that the saliency effect is driven largely by an expansion of consumers' consideration sets

Evaluation of the Reforms of the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court 2010-2013

Over the course of this report, we analyse both quantitatively and qualitatively the impact of the 2010­ 2013 reforms undertaken at the former Patents County Court (PCC), now the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC). The reforms introduced a number of changes staggered over the period 2010­ 2013, including a cap on recoverable costs and damages, a reduction of the length as well as complexity of court actions, and a reconstitution of the PCC as the IPEC. In our quantitative case counts we find that there has been a large increase in the quantity of cases filed at the IPEC, post-reforms, while through a comparative study of the High Court (HC) and Patents Court (PHC) we show that with the exception of patent cases, there has not been a corresponding increase in cases at the higher level. We find quantitative and qualitative evidence that the costs cap and active case management by the IPEC judge have been the most influential reforms with respect to the large increase in cases filed at the IPEC post-reforms. We also note that case filings by SMEs have increased substantially following the reforms, fulfilling one of the key aims of the reforms. Importantly, we find that this effect is driven by changes at the extensive (more claimants) and intensive (more cases per claimant) margins of litigation behaviour at the IPEC. Finally, we provide a theoretical model that allows us to gauge the effect of the reforms on those IP disputes that never reach a court. Our theoretical predictions suggest that in addition to encouraging more IPEC case filings, the reforms have had the effect of increasing the quantity of out-of-court settlements as well

Is there a patent troll problem in the UK?

This paper reports the findings of an empirical study of patent suits involving non-practicing entities (NPEs) in the U.K. between 2000 and 2010. Overall, we find that NPEs are responsible for 11% of all patent suits filed in the U.K. during this period. Though this is a small percentage by U.S. standards, our study suggests that patent trolling might not be as uniquely American as conventional wisdom suggests. We also find little support for many common explanations for Europe’s relative scarcity of NPE activity. For example, we find that NPEs litigating in the U.K. overwhelmingly assert high-tech patents – even more so, in fact, than their U.S. counterparts – despite higher barriers to software patentability in Europe. Our study does, however, tend to support fee-shifting as a key reason for the U.K.’s immunity to NPEs. We see evidence that the U.K.’s loser-pays legal regime deters NPEs from filing suit, while at the same time encouraging accused infringers to defend claims filed against them. U.K. NPE suits are initiated by potential infringers more often than by NPEs; rarely end in settlement; very rarely end in victory for NPEs; and, thus, result in an attorney’s fee award to the potential infringer more often than a damages award or settlement payment to the patentee. Together, these findings tend to support patent reform bills pending in the U.S. that would implement a fee-shifting regime for patent suits, and may also serve to lessen concerns that Europe’s forthcoming Unified Patent Court will draw NPEs to Europe

Patent Litigation in Europe

We compare patent litigation cases across four European jurisdictions—Germany, the UK (England and Wales), France, The Netherlands—using case-level data gathered from cases filed in the four jurisdictions during the period 2000–2008. Overall, we find substantial differences across jurisdictions in terms of caseloads—notably, courts in Germany hear by far the largest number of cases, not only in absolute terms, but also when taking macro-economic indicators into account—and we further find important cross-country variances in terms of case outcomes. Moreover, we show empirically that a considerable number of patents are litigated across multiple European jurisdictions; and further, that in the majority of these cases divergent case outcomes are reached across the different jurisdictions, suggesting that the long-suspected problem of inconsistency of decision-making in European patent litigation is in fact real. Finally, we note that the coming into force of the Unified Patent Court in Europe may, in the long term, help to alleviate this inconsistency problem

Trade Mark Cluttering: An Exploratory Report

This report explores the problem of “cluttering” of trade mark registers. The report consists of two parts: the first presents a conceptual discussion of “clutte ring” of trade mark registers. The second part provides an exploratory empirical analysis of trade mark applications at the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) and the European trade mark office (OHIM). This part contains results of a descriptive and an econometric analysis. According to our definition, cluttering arises where firms hold trade marks that are overly broad or unused raising search costs for later applicants. The report distinguishes between three mechanisms that can lead to cluttering. It also considers a series of mechanisms that work against cluttering. This discussion is based on a review of the previous literature. The tentative empirical evidence provided in the second part of the report suggests that trade marks are more frequently registered in several classes at the same time and also that firms in pharmaceuticals increasingly resort to multiple simultaneous applications to ensure that they will register at least one trade mark. There is also some evidence that firms seek to avoid mechanisms such as relative grounds examination which can prevent cluttering. Finally, we report direct survey-based evidence that applicants perceive cluttering to be a problem in specific fields and countries. However, our exploratory analysis does not provide strong evidence that cluttering has already become a systemic problem for the trade mark systems that is comparable to the effect of patent thickets for patent systems